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Abstract
Workfare proposals concentrate on the work incentives for welfare recipients, thus focusing
on the labor supply side. This paper analyzes the effects workfare has on labor demand when
the labor market is unionized. As workfare reduces the number of recipients of public
financial assistance, a workfare regime, as opposed to a welfare system, weakens the outside
option of trade unions in wage negotiations. It is shown that revenue-neutral workfare
enforcement where any surpluses are rebated by i) reducing the income tax or ii) increasing a
workers’ tax credit, unambiguously decreases gross wage rates and thus decreases equilibrium
unemployment. Though trade union members may be worse off as a consequence of workfare
enforcement, their compensation for the wage reduction is highest when the revenue-neutral
rebate of savings is used to increase worker-specific tax credits.
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The subsystems of welfare states aiming at the alleviation of poverty have come under attack.
In many European countries such as France or Germany, maintaining a subsistence level of
income is still the primary objective, but there is also a growing consensus that the systems
should move towards a system such as e.g. the “Earned Income Tax Credit” in the United
States which rewards additional household income. The main idea of these “workfare” or,
synonymously, “welfare-to-work” type of programs is to reward work instead of
unemployment by granting public monetary assistance only for those who are willing to work.
The promise of these workfare proposals is to overcome the poverty trap and to increase labor
supply. In addition, it is argued that those who are willing to work enjoy some non-pecuniary
advantages such as increased self-esteem, a reduction in stigmatization as a jobless person and
the (re-)learning of certain basic skills, which are essential for competing for ordinary jobs.
1
Last but not least, these programs allow the government to reduce public expenditures for
welfare programs while retaining a broad social consensus.
The existing literature on workfare almost entirely neglects the effects workfare may
have on the labor demand side. In economies with unionized labor markets, however, it is
necessary to determine the effects on labor demand rather than labor supply because the labor
demand falls short of labor supply due to too high wage costs thus causing unemployment.
This paper therefore focuses on the repercussions of workfare schemes on the wage
determination in unionized labor markets.
Our analysis shows that in an economy where trade unions determine the wage rate in
their sectors and the firms then determine employment, a workfare system, as opposed to a
welfare system, weakens the outside option of the trade union in the wage negotiations.
Therefore, wages tend to decrease and unemployment to fall. Furthermore, as less individuals
are in need of public assistance, the budget surplus generated by the workfare regime can be
used for further labor market policy measures.
                                                
1 See e.g. Clark and Oswald (1994), Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1995) and Gerlach and Stephan (1996).– 2 –
Two complementary policy measures will be included into our analysis, namely a
revenue-neutral cut in the income tax rate and, alternatively, a revenue-neutral rise in the
workers’ tax credit. It is shown that the latter is both more efficient with respect to promoting
employment and less harmful for trade unions. Their members become partially compensated
for the wage reductions. This may reduce the political resistance of trade unions to any kind
of workfare regime.
The main feature of workfare programs we focus on in this paper is the selection
principle, which means that the obligation to work separates the truly needy out of the pool of
welfare recipients (Besley and Coate 1992). Empirically, one of the most visible effects of the
program is a dramatic reduction in the number of beneficiaries. Cancian et al. (2000) shows
for the USA that among those who left the welfare program, about two thirds entered a job,
while one third remained without. Thus welfare programs become less expensive after the
reform than before, with average annual cost decreases for the respective programs of 6.3% in
the U.S. as a whole and 9.1% in Wisconsin where a specific workfare program, called
“Wisconsin Works” was established.
2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the selection principle of
workfare and shows how it can be applied for the analysis of the impact a reform of the
welfare system towards a workfare system will have on wage determination. Section 3
introduces a monopoly trade union model where trade unions set wages in their sectors and
firms then determine employment. Within this analytical framework, we will show how a
piecemeal move towards a workfare system changes the equilibrium wage rate in the
economy. Section 4 then compares the efficiency of two alternative complementary policy
measures, which make use of the budget surplus generated by the workfare scheme. Section
5, by contrast, focuses on the distributional consequences. Implications for economic policy
will be presented in the concluding Section 6. For the sake of the clarity of the argument,
most of the calculations are presented in the Appendix.
                                                
2 According to the Congressional Research Service (2000, p. 407), between 1995 and 1999 expenditure for
welfare in the USA has gone down by 27.8% while in Wisconsin the reduction was 41.6%. Given the decline of
73.6% in the number of welfare recipients in Wisconsin in the same period, the savings in total welfare
expenditure might even have been much higher, had they not been partly offset by increasing welfare payments
and administrative expense per family.– 3 –
2. From welfare to workfare
The idea of workfare is to replace the existing welfare system, in which payments are made
unconditionally to all welfare recipients, by a mutual contract in which welfare payments are
granted only conditionally upon a service rendered in return by the recipient. The required
work, which may be a job in the private sector or, alternatively, in a public job creation
company, serves as a selection mechanism, which ensures that only truly needy persons
actually obtain public transfers. In this section we illustrate the selection mechanism of a
workfare scheme by using a simplified version of the Besley and Coate (1992) model.
Thereby, we modify the model in a way that allows us to analyze the effect of workfare on
wage determination and labor demand, respectively.
In the economy, there are N workers each supplying one unit of labor in the labor
market.  N L ≤  workers are employed in the primary labor market,  L N −  workers are
registered as being unemployed and entitled to receive unemployment benefit payments 
u b .
All workers are identical with respect to their working abilities. However, when unemployed,
we distinguish two types of workers, which differ with respect to their access to non-market
income of 
n b . The share s of all workers has no access to non-market income and must
entirely rely on the public unemployment benefit payments 
u b  when becoming unemployed.
By contrast,  N s) 1 ( −  workers have access to non-market labor income when unemployed.
The government cannot observe non-market income. Thus, in a pure welfare regime, there are
) ( L N s −  unemployed workers who entirely rely on welfare benefit payments while
) )( 1 ( L N s − −  unemployed workers obtain both unemployment benefit payments and non-
market income. Throughout the paper we assume that working in the primary labor market is
always preferred to working in the non-market sector.
Figure 1 shows the budget constraint for workers with access to non-market income.
Hours worked in the non-market sector are measured on the horizontal axis, while total
income is measured on the vertical axis. Those with access to non-market income face an
upward sloping budget line, starting in 
u b . Given their preferences
3 with respect to income
and leisure, workers with access to non-market activities work T hours, adding a non-market
                                                
3 In Figure 1 we assume a quasi-linear utility function.– 4 –
income of 
n b  to the unemployment benefit payment 
u b  they receive. Thus, their total income
is 
n u b b + . The utility when working,  ) , ( T b b u
n u +  exceeds that of non-working,  ) 0 , (
u b u .
Those who have no access to non-market income face a horizontal budget line. Their income
is 
u b .
Figure 1: The selection mechanism of workfare
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If the government requires that, in order to qualify for the unemployment benefit payment,
each welfare recipient has to work C hours in e.g. a public job creation company, those
without access to non-market income accept the workfare scheme. Their utility decreases
from ) 0 , (
u b u  to  ) , ( C b u
u , but they are better off compared to the alternative not to work in
the public job creation company, and consequently losing their unemployment benefit
payments. By contrast, those unemployed workers with access to non-market income are
indifferent between staying and leaving the workfare regime as their budget constraint shifts
rightwards, now starting at the point  ) , ( C b
u . However, compared to the situation without a
workfare program, they are worse off by the amount of  ) , ( ) , ( T b u T b b u
n n u − + . If the
required working time exceeded C, they would leave the workfare scheme because the
implicit hourly wage falls short of the non-market hourly remuneration. If the time required to
stay in the public job creation company falls short of C, they would join the workfare– 5 –
program. Note that if the government considers 
u b  as the minimum income level, workfare
makes sense only if 
u n b b > . Both types of unemployed are worse off in a workfare system.
If the government could perfectly enforce a workfare regime, which requires all
unemployed benefit recipients to work C hours, the expected welfare payments would be
reduced by 
u b s) 1 ( − . However, the government normally cannot introduce a comprehensive
workfare scheme because of administrative obstacles such as the lack of sufficient job
opportunities available in job creation companies. Let α measure the degree of workfare
enforcement, then the average income of an unemployed worker, 
a b , is given by:
( ) ( ) ()
n u n u n u a b s b s b s b b s sb b ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − + − α − = − + α − + − + α = .( 1 )
With probability α an unemployed worker has to participate in a workfare scheme, with
probability ) 1 ( α −  he can stay in the traditional welfare scheme. In the former case, only the
share s of all unemployed workers receives the unemployment benefit payments while in the
latter case, all unemployed workers do. Independently of what regime prevails,  ) )( 1 ( L N s − −
unemployed workers receive the non-market income 
n b . 
Equation (1) denotes the expected income of an unemployed worker as a function of
the degree of workfare enforcement α. As the degree of enforcement increases, the average
unemployment income decreases:







Having determined the expected income of a worker who becomes unemployed, we can now
turn to the trade union’s decision problem.
3. The monopolized labor market
We consider the labor market of a small open economy with I sectors. Each sector is perfectly
specialized in the production of good  I i X
i ,..., 1 , = , which is completely exported and sold on
the world market at a world market price normalized to unity. In each sector of the economy
labor supply is given by 
i N , and all workers are organized in a sector-wide operating trade– 6 –
union. Sector i produces output 
i X  with labor 
i L  as the only variable input. The production
function is strictly concave, i.e.  0 , 0 ), ( < > = LL L
i i f f L f X . As each firm considers both the
wage rate and the producer price as given, it maximizes profit with respect to labor input.
Profit maximization yields the labor demand function  ) (
i i w L L =  with  0 <
i
w L . For technical
convenience, in what follows we assume that the wage elasticity of labor demand
1 − < = η
i i
w
i L wL  is constant.
4 Furthermore, instead of modeling wage bargaining between a
trade union and the firms explicitly, we focus on a monopoly trade union model, as this model
derives the same qualitative results as the “right-to-manage” bargaining model for those
variables that affect the trade union objective only (cf. Holmlund, Löfgren and Engström
1989).
The objective of the monopoly trade union is to maximize its members’ income, which
consists of the net-of-tax wage income and the expected net-of-tax unemployment income. As
each worker inelasticly supplies one unit of labor if employed, or zero labor if unemployed,
the net-of-tax wage income depends on the gross wage rate w, the income tax t, and the
personal tax credit a which is granted to each tax payer, i.e.  a t w + − ) 1 (.
Trade union members who do not find a job in their sector i will not necessarily
become unemployed. With a probability equal to the economy wide employment rate  ) 1 ( u − ,
with u denoting the economy-wide unemployment rate, they will find a job in another sector
earning the expected average gross wage rate w . With probability u they become
unemployed and are thus receiving on average (from the viewpoint of the trade union) the
unemployment income as given by equation (1). Following Layard, Nickell and Jackman
(1991), we assume that the unemployment benefit payments are proportionate to the expected
net-of-tax wage income in the economy, i.e.
() a t w b
u + − γ = ) 1 (. ( 3 )
                                                
4 This production function implicitly assumes that there is some fixed factor, e.g. capital, leading to decreasing
marginal productivity of labor. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production technology, e.g., guarantees a constant
labor demand elasticity.– 7 –
The non-market income, by contrast, is not related to the gross wage rate in the primary sector
and is exogenously given in what follows. Substituting equation (3) in (1), the opportunity
cost of working in the own sector is given by
() ( ) () () ()
n a i b s u a t w s u ub a t w u b ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − + + − − α − γ − − = + + − − = .( 4 )
Having analyzed the different real income components, we can specify the objective function
of the trade union, which can be written as
5
( ) ) ( ) 1 (
i i i i i i L N b L a t w V − + + − = .( 5 )









w L b a t w L t V − + − + − = = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 0.
Note that from the viewpoint of the trade union, the reservation wage 
i b  is exogenously
determined. Taking account of the labor demand of the firms in sector i and using the
elasticity of labor demand, the gross wage rate in sector i is implicitly given by:
0 ) ( ) 1 )( 1 ( = η − + η + −
i i b a t w .( 6 )
Condition (6) reveals that the workers’ tax credit must be smaller than the opportunity cost of
working in this sector (4),  0 < −
i b a , to obtain an interior solution. Otherwise the trade union
would always ensure that full-employment is established in the sector. In what follows, we
focus on the case where the workers’ tax credit is smaller than the unemployment benefit
payment 
u b  as empirically the tax credit is only a small proportion of the net-of-tax labor
income while the replacement ratio γ normally exceeds 50% (cf. Nickell and Layard, 1999).
Thus, we have 
i a u b b b a ≤ ≤ < .
Following Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) we consider the symmetric case where
all sectors exhibit the same production function and face the same labor supply 
i N . Thus, in
equilibrium all sectors will face the same marginal productivity of labor and the gross wage
rate is the same everywhere,  i w w w
i ∀ ≡ = . Aggregate labor supply is given by  N N I
i = ⋅
                                                
5  The use of a linear objective function is for analytical convenience. Alternatively, without changing the
qualitative results, we could assume that the trade union maximizes the expected utility of its representative
worker, taking into account the risk aversion of its members.– 8 –
and aggregate employment by  L L I
i = ⋅ . Substituting equation (4) in (6), we can solve for the
aggregate equilibrium unemployment rate u (using 
i η = η )
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Note first that if there is no tax credit a available for workers and there are no non-market
opportunities to raise the expected unemployment income, i.e.  0 = =
n b a , the unemployment
rate (7) is independent of the labor tax rate. In this case, there is also no scope for the
government to apply the separating device of a workfare regime. Thus,






n b a u .
The result, that the unemployment rate is independent of the tax rate, confirms a frequently
quoted result that, in the long run, the labor tax burden is completely shifted onto workers.
However, in the presence of a progressive tax structure – due to the tax credit the average tax
rate falls short of the marginal tax rate – and some unemployment income components, which
are not proportionate to the gross wage rate, the labor tax rate does affect the aggregate
unemployment rate even in the long run (cf. Schöb 2000). This result is in line with recent
empirical studies of the effects of labor taxes on unemployment (cf. Layard and Nickell 1999,
Daveri and Tabellini 2000, Reutter 2001). Thus, it is important to not only analyze the direct
effect workfare has on wage determination but to also take account of how the other control
variables of the government affect the aggregate unemployment rate. We therefore proceed in
two steps. We first analyze how cet. par. workfare enforcement affects wage determination
and employment. Then, in the next section, we analyze the overall effect of revenue-neutral
workfare enforcement when the budget surplus generated by the workfare enforcement is
rebated. 
The gross wage rate reacts to changes in the degree of workfare enforcement α, the tax
rate  t and the personal tax credit a. The calculations are presented in Appendix 1. With





Increasing the degree of workfare enforcement reduces the gross wage rate set by the
monopoly trade union. It works in the same way as a reduction in the replacement ratio γ. The
average income of an unemployed worker falls as fewer unemployed workers receive the non-
market income 
n b . This weakens the outside option of the trade union as it raises the wage
surplus, lost by those laid off due to a wage increase. At the same time, the benefit for the
incumbent workers remains unaffected. It becomes thus profitable for the union to accept a
lower gross wage. Thus aggregate employment increases.
PROPOSITION 1: Enforcing workfare cet. par. lowers the equilibrium gross wage rate in
an economy with unionized labor markets and promotes labor demand.
4. Revenue-neutral workfare enforcement
As shown in Section 2, enforcing workfare reduces public expenditures for unemployment
benefit payments. This allows the government to either reduce the (uniform) income tax rate
t or to increase the tax credit a. The public budget is given by
() R L N b s aL wL t
u = − − α − − − π + ) ( ) 1 ( 1 ) (,
where R denotes a predetermined level of public revenues needed to finance some public
goods. The first term indicates the income tax revenues, the second term denotes the
expenditures for the workers’ tax credit and the third term denotes the expenditures for the
public unemployment benefit system. For simplicity we abstract from both cost of workfare
enforcement and revenues generated in public job creation companies. Substituting in the
long-run relationship for the unemployment benefit payments (3), we can rewrite the budget
constraint as
() () R L N a t w s aL wL t = − + − γ − α − − − π + ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) (. ( 9 )– 10 –
As shown in Appendix 2, the direct effect of enforcing workfare generates a surplus,
0 ) ( ) 1 ( > − − = α L N b s R
u  [cf. equation (2)]. Furthermore, the induced effect of a lower gross
wage rate also generates a surplus as we have  0 < w R . The total effect of workfare











The budget surplus exceeds the savings from reduced unemployment benefit payments as tax
revenues are increasing in employment. This budget surplus can be used to either reduce the






























+ = = α 0 . (11)
In what follows we analyze the two cases where either only the income tax,  0 = da , or the tax
credit,  0 = dt , is altered. Assuming that the tax system is Laffer-efficient, i.e.
0 > + dt dw R R w t  and  0 < + da dw R R w a , the change in the income tax rate and the tax






















Next, we turn to the comparative statics results. As is shown analytically in the Appendix 1, a
change in the income tax rate has an ambiguous effect on gross wages. If the workers’ tax
credit is zero, increasing the income tax rate leads to a higher gross wage rate. In this case, an
increase in the income tax reduces the net-of-tax wage rate relatively more than the outside
option 
i b . However, if the parts of the outside option that are not proportional to the gross
wage become negative – this is the case when the tax credit becomes large relative to the non-
market income – the opposite result may occur.
Empirical estimates about the long-run effects of changes in the labor tax wedge
indicate that the unemployment rate (and therefore the gross wage rate) is increasing in the
labor tax rate. Nickell and Layard (1999, p. 3053) regress the log unemployment rate on the– 11 –
total labor tax wedge (among a variety of controls) in a cross-country study with 20 OECD
countries over two five-years periods and find that a one-percentage point increase of the
labor tax rate would reduce unemployment by 0.27 percentage points. Daveri and Tabellini
(2000) argue that the effects of tax rate changes on unemployment differ between different
OECD countries. While they did not find any significant effect for countries like the US,
Japan or the Scandinavian countries, the tax wedge effect is more pronounced than reported in
Nickell and Layard (1999) in countries like Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and Spain. They regress the standardized unemployment rate on the effective tax
rate on labor income and report a labor tax coefficient between 0.29 and 0.54 (see their Table
9, p.75).
If the budget surplus of workfare enforcement is used to cut the income tax rate, the




























The first term of the right-hand side covers the direct effect as described in the last section. A
revenue-neutral enforcement of workfare allows the government to lower the income tax. In
the empirically relevant case  0 > dt dw , the direct effect is reinforced by the induced cut in
the income tax rate. Both workfare enforcement and the reduced income tax rate lead the
trade unions to lower wages. But even if the indirect effect works in the opposite direction,
the overall effect still remains negative (cf. Appendix 3). Proposition 2 summarizes.
PROPOSITION 2: Revenue-neutral workfare enforcement that lowers the income tax rate,
lowers the equilibrium gross wage rate in an economy with unionized labor markets and
thus increases employment.
The comparative statics for the workers’ tax credit (cf. Appendix 1) shows that the gross wage




. (13)– 12 –
An increase in the workers’ tax credit a can be interpreted as a subsidy on labor. A higher
labor subsidy induces the trade union to accept a lower wage rate as the marginal worker can
now gain more from working than those already employed will lose from the necessary wage
reduction. The total effect of a revenue-neutral workfare enforcement, which increases the




























As in the case of lowering the income tax, the increase of the workers’ tax credit reinforces
the direct effect of workfare enforcement due to lower average unemployment benefit
payments. Proposition 3 summarizes.
PROPOSITION 3: Revenue-neutral workfare enforcement that increases the workers’ tax,
credit lowers the equilibrium gross wage rate in an economy with unionized labor markets
and thus increases employment.
Though the Propositions 2 and 3 show qualitatively the same effect on the gross wage rate
and employment, the effects may differ quantitatively. To identify the more efficient reform
with respect to alleviating unemployment, let us consider the case where the government has
already rebated the budget surplus by reducing the income tax rate but now reverses the
reduction of the income tax and increases the workers’ tax credit instead. This can be








































Both terms of the numerator of the right-hand side are negative. The second term covers the
fact that the increase in the workers’ tax credit is partly financed by increasing the tax on
profit income. This lowers the tax burden on labor and thus lowers the gross wage rate.
However, even if the tax revenues from profit taxation did not change, increasing the
workers’ tax credit, financed by an increase in a pure labor tax rate, would lower the gross– 13 –
wage rate. This is covered by the first term. Intuitively, an increase in tax progression
moderates wages because it acts as a penalty on wage increases. While the average tax burden
on labor is kept constant, the arbitrage condition of the monopoly trade union changes as the
incumbent workers benefit less from a wage increase the higher the (marginal) labor tax rate
is. As the cost of a wage increase does not change at the margin, the monopoly trade union
will lower the wage rate. This result confirms the analysis of Koskela and Vilmunen (1996)
who have shown that a more progressive tax system will go along with higher employment in
popular models of trade union behavior including the monopoly trade union model. The effect
is strengthened though by the fact that a higher uniform tax rate on income allows the
government to obtain more revenues from non-distorting profit taxation.
PROPOSITION 4: Increasing the workers’ tax credit is more effective in promoting
employment than reducing the income tax rate.
So far we have focused on the efficiency aspects of workfare enforcement. Now we turn to
the politically important question about the distributional consequences workfare enforcement
will have.
5. Distributional considerations
Enforcing workfare lowers the opportunity cost of working in the own sector, 
i b , and thus the
bargaining position of the trade union. As a consequence, the trade union members will be
worse off as we have  0 < i b V . However, as discussed in the previous section, enforcing
workfare induces effects on the gross wage rate and aggregate employment and allows the
government to either reduce the income tax or increase the workers’ tax credit. As the latter is
more efficient in raising employment it is interesting to analyze whether this is also favorable
with respect to minimizing the redistributive consequences of workfare enforcement. The
lower the distributive effects are the higher the political acceptance of workfare would be in
an economy with unionized labor markets.
To analyze the question we first compare the change in the trade union objective
function when workfare enforcement is accompanied by a revenue-neutral increase in the– 14 –
workers’ tax credit with the change when workfare enforcement is accompanied by a revenue-






















As is shown in Appendix 5, the difference is unambiguously positive. There are three reasons
for this result. Firstly, increasing the workers’ tax credit ensures that rebating the budget
surplus benefit workers only. By contrast, any reduction of the income tax would benefit both
labor income and profits. Secondly, as profits increase in employment additional tax revenues
from profit taxation are generated which are returned to the workers. Thirdly, even in the
absence of the first two effects, rebating the budget surplus via an increase in the workers’ tax
credit is always more beneficial to the trade union, because it ensures that for any given level
of public unemployment benefit payments and workfare enforcement, more members are
employed in the primary labor market. Thus, political resistance of trade unions against
workfare schemes can be reduced when the budget surplus generated by a move towards a
workfare scheme is handed back to workers only by increasing specific worker tax credits.
The following proposition summarizes this finding.
PROPOSITION 5: Increasing the workers’ tax credit minimizes the loss accruing to trade
union members due to workfare enforcement.
6. Concluding remarks
The last decade saw a growing number of labor market reforms that aim at promoting
workfare. The idea of all these proposals is to warrant work instead of unemployment. This
can alleviate the unemployment of those caught in the poverty trap where it is individually
rational not to work. As long as the labor market is sufficiently flexible to offer jobs to those
who supply labor, successful workfare programs will boost employment and reduce the cost
of the welfare state. However, in countries suffering from unemployment due to unionized– 15 –
labor markets, promoting labor supply cannot be sufficient to also promote employment, since
in economies with unionized labor markets the labor market is rationed by the labor demand.
In this paper we show how the introduction of a workfare scheme will affect labor demand.
As workfare reduces the number of recipients of public financial assistance, a workfare
regime, as opposed to a welfare system, weakens the outside option of trade unions in wage
negotiations and consequently moderates wages and boosts employment.
As trade union members are worse off as a consequence of workfare enforcement, it is
likely that trade unions will strictly oppose the idea of moving the system of welfare to a
system of workfare. It is thus important to see which complementary measures can be
undertaken to lower the potential resistance of trade unions. One way to at least partially
compensate workers is to rebate savings in welfare expenditures in a way that benefit workers
only.
One important insight of our analysis is that there is a combination of instruments, i.e.
introducing workfare and increasing workers tax credit, that is preferable both in terms of
efficiency and minimal distributional consequences. The efficiency result confirms the
analysis of Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) who have shown that a more progressive tax system
tends to increase employment, as for any given average tax rate on labor, a higher marginal
tax rate works like a penalty on wage increases. Thus, any revenue surpluses should be
rebated in a way that increases rather than decreases tax progression. In our framework this
can be achieved by raising the worker-specific tax credit. This policy is even more efficient,
as the alternative, lowering income tax, would imply that the non-distorting profit tax will be
lowered.
The analysis of the distributional consequences then proved in the case of a workfare
reform that the more efficient instrument turns out to also be the less harmful instrument for
those likely to be the losers of the reform. For workers, higher worker-specific tax credits are
favorable to cuts in income taxes for three reasons. First, increasing the worker-specific tax
credit benefits workers only. Second, the higher the income tax rate the more additional tax
revenues are generated from profit taxation when  employment and thus profits rise. Finally,
and most important, rebating the budget surplus via an increase in the tax credit is always– 16 –
more beneficial to the trade union, because it ensures that for any given level of public
unemployment benefit payments and workfare enforcement, more members are employed in
the primary labor market.
In a time where the ongoing fight between unions and capital owners about the
distribution of the domestic product apparently paralyzes all attempts to reform the labor
market, it may be considered good news that there are still some policy options available that
alleviate the distributive consequences to an extent that may overcome the reform holdup
many European countries are trapped in.
Appendix 1: comparative statics
To analyze how the gross wage rate reacts to changes in the degree of workfare enforcement,
the tax credit, and the tax rate, we define an implicit function g
()() () ( ) [ ]
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The sign of a change in the income tax depends on the relationship between personal tax
credit and the non-market income of unemployed workers and is a priori. The numerator
equals the part of the outside option that isn’t proportional to the wage rate as can be seen
from rewriting (4) in the following way
() () () () () ( ) a s b s u t w s u a b
n i ) 1 ( 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 − α − γ − − − + − − α − γ − − + = .
If the workers’ tax credit is zero, this component is positive, (A4) becomes negative while a
positive tax credit together with  0 =
n b  leads to a positive sign. and an increase in the income– 17 –
tax rate increases the gross wage rate. The reason is that, in this case, an increase in the
income tax reduces the net-of-tax wage rate by more than the outside option 
i b . Only if the
non-proportional component becomes negative, the opposite result may occur.
6
Finally, partial differentiation of g with respect to the gross wage rate yields:
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(A5) can be rewritten as:
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The second term is always positive. As long as  L N 2 < , i.e. the unemployment rate is below
50%, the first term is also positive as  1 − < η . Hence,  0 > w g . The effect of changes in the
workfare enforcement, the tax credit and the income tax rate respectively on the gross wage
rate is given by the condition:
t a j dw g dj g w j , , , 0 α = = + .







j , , , α = − = .( A 7 )
Appendix 2: marginal tax revenues
Partial derivatives of the budget constraint (9) yield:
() 0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > − + − − γ = α L N a t w s R ,( A 8 )
() 0 ) ( ) 1 ( 1 < − − α − γ − − = L N s L Ra ,( A 9 )
                                                
6 Note that the first term of the right-hand side does not matter for this argument. Substituting in the formulation
(4*) into the objective function (5) shows that that the workers’ tax credit a can be decomposed into a lump-sum
subsidy to all 
i N  workers and a negative unemployment benefit component equal to  () () a s) 1 ( 1 1 − α − γ − .– 18 –
() 0 ) ( ) 1 ( 1 ) ( > − π = − − α − γ + = a t wR L N w s L f R , (A10)
and, using  ) (L f wL = π + , and  w fL = :
() () ( ) [] w w L a t w s a tw L N t s R + − γ − α − + − + − − − α − γ − = ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( 1 ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 . (A11)
The first term is negative. Assuming that the average tax burden on labor is positive, i.e.
0 > − a tw , the term in square brackets is positive and thus the second term is also negative. 
Appendix 3: reducing the income tax
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As the first term is positive, we can focus on the sign of the expression in square brackets.
Substituting in (A2), (A4), (A8) and (A10), we obtain, after some calculations:
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As 0 < −
a b a , we have  0 < − α α g R g R t t  and therefore the sign as indicated in (14).
Appendix 4: a change in tax progression
From (11), using (A7) to describe the indirect effect of a revenue-neutral tax reform that
increases both the workers’ tax credit and the income tax, we obtain the following condition
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As the marginal tax revenues of the income tax are positive and  0 > w g , the denominator is
positive. Using (A3), it follows immediately that the second term of the right-hand side is
negative. Substituting (A3) and (A4) into the first term and using (4), we obtain
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Appendix 5: comparing reforms
The partial derivative of the trade union objective function (5) with respect to workfare
enforcement α, the workers’ tax credit a, the income tax rate t, and the average equilibrium
wage rate  w w =  are (Note that  0 = i w V ):
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Substituting in the definition for the aggregate unemployment rate, the first term of (A18) can
be rewritten as:
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Using the same reformulation as in (A14) and then using (6), the second term becomes
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Substituting (A19) and (A20) in (A18) allows us to sign  w V :
() () 0 ) 1 ( )) 1 ( 1 ( 1
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Noting that the second term in brackets in the last line is negative and the change in the tax
credit due to an increase in the degree of workfare enforcement is positive, we can obtain the














































































































































































Multiplying through, noting that the left denominator is positive while the right one is
negative ( 0 < w g ):













































Checking the signs in (A3), (A4), (A6), (A16), (A17) and (A13), it can be seen that
() ( ) () 0 > − π − + − w a a w t a w a a w g V g V g wg R V R V .q e d .– 22 –
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